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Using Courts to Enforce the Free Speech Provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Ambika Kumar*
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR" or "Covenant"), "[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression."'
Over 150 countries have ratified this agreement, but dozens have neither signed,
ratified nor enforced it.2 In some of these countries, there are few strong free
speech advocates. In others, free speech lobbies have failed for a variety of
reasons-government officials may believe they already allow important speech
to exist without punishment, struggle to draft or implement legislation given the
ambiguous contours of free speech, or face strong anti-speech groups.
In light of these conditions, I suggest that advocates for liberal free speech
rules, as laid out in Article 19 of the ICCPR, should look to their courts for
solutions. Foremost, courts may be uniquely positioned to enforce the ICCPR
by relying on its language and reading an inherent right to political speech into
the constitutions of their respective governments. In addition, judges, who in
many countries receive life tenure and guaranteed salaries, do not face the same
political pressure as legislators. Finally, courts have traditionally been
instrumental in guaranteeing individual freedoms that might be politically
contentious or amorphously defined. Thus, using courts to regulate Article 19
rights serves both strategic and normative goals: judges are more likely to
recognize free speech rights by relying on international law, and they are better
fit to do so.

1

AB 2002, Duke University; JD Candidate 2006, The University of Chicago.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), art 19, 6 ILM 368, 374 (1967)

(hereinafter ICCPR).
2

A full list of countries that have ratified and/or signed the ICCPR is available online at
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty6.asp>
(visited Apr 22, 2006).
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More specifically, I suggest that one country's growing experience with the
enforcement of political speech guarantees-Australia's-serves as a useful case
study to support these propositions. Free speech lobbies in Australia have failed.
Instead, the nation's highest court, in accordance with international law, has
recently recognized an implied right to political communication in its
constitution, which itself contains no explicit individual guarantees. In doing so,
albeit somewhat unintentionally, the High Court of Australia ("High Court")
single-handedly brought Australia within the realm of ICCPR Article 19
compliance. With some qualifications, other nations can learn an important
lesson from the Australian free speech experience, specifically as articulated by
Justice Michael Kirby: courts may be particularly well suited to apply and enforce
the ICCPR's core protections of speech. Part II reviews international free speech
obligations under the ICCPR and countries' efforts to comply with them. Part
III describes and analyzes Australia's struggle with judicial enforcement. Part IV
argues that, as evidenced by this struggle, courts are particularly suited to enforce
the free speech provisions of the ICCPR.

II. INTERNATIONAL FREE SPEECH NORMS
A. THE ICCPR: HISTORY AND APPLICATION
Pursuant to a mandate in the UN Charter, the UN Economic and Social
Council created the Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") in 1946.'
As its first task, the Commission created the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("UDHR"), a document containing principles that many scholars now
consider customary international law. However, the UDHR does not contain
any enforcement or interpretive mechanisms, and it is not sufficiently specific to
bind nations. Thus, the Commission created the ICCPR, a comprehensive
accord embodying in more detail many rights enumerated in the UDHR.' The
ICCPR took effect ten years following its 1966 adoption,6 after the requisite
number of nations ratified it.'
Under Article 19 of the ICCPR, individuals have the rights to hold and
express opinions of all kinds.8 A more restrictive proposal at the time would
3

Scott N. Carlson and Gregory Gisvold, PracticalGuide to the InternationalCovenant on Civiland Polifical

4

Id.

Rights 1 (Transnational 2003).
5

Id at 1-2.

6

Id at 2.

7

Thomas Buergental, InternationalHuman Rights: In a Nutshell 38 (2d ed West 1995).

8

Article 19 of the ICCPR provides in its entirety:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
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have limited the freedoms to "political liberty" and contained more exceptions
allowing the suspension of speech rights. 9 To presently qualify as an exception,
the restriction must be established by law and necessary to serve a listed
purpose-either "the respect of the rights or reputations of others" or "the
protection
of national security or of public order... or of public health or
10
morals."'
Although some Commission members say the term "necessary" means that
a law must be proportional to its ends," the ICCPR exceptions are potentially
quite broad. For example, speakers in the United States often criticize public
figures, a practice permitted by domestic courts,12 even though such speech
could theoretically, under Article 19, endanger national security or public health.
The Human Rights Committee ("Committee"), created in 1950 to monitor
and interpret the ICCPR, 3 has demonstrated leniency in some cases, and
discipline in others, leaving the scope of Article 19 in further doubt. For
example, in Hert-beg v Finland,the Committee entertained a broad interpretation
of "public morals" when it upheld a Finnish broadcaster's decision to censor
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.

10
11
12

13

ICCPR, art 19, 6 ILM at 374 (cited in note 1).
Carlson and Gisvold, PracticalGuide at 120 (cited in note 3). The idea that only political expression
would be protected is tenable. Some contemporary American legal scholars believe the First
Amendment should protect only this form of expression. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Princples
and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 28 (1971) ("The notion that all valuable types of
speech must be protected by the first amendment confuses the constitutionality of laws with their
wisdom. Freedom of non-political speech rests, as does freedom for other valuable forms of
behavior, upon the enlightenment of society and its elected representatives.").
ICCPR, art 19, § 3, 6 ILM at 374 (cited in note 1).
Carlson and Gisvold, PracticalGuide at 122 (cited in note 3).
See, for example, Hustler Magazjne, Inc v Falwell,485 US 46 (1988) (reversing damages awarded for
intentional infliction of emotional distress after a magazine published an advertisement suggesting
that the Reverend Jerry Falwell lost his virginity to his mother).
See Carlson and Gisvold, PracticalGuide at 2-5 (cited in note 3). The Committee serves as one of
the seven treaty bodies of the UN, each responsible for monitoring and interpreting a specific
treaty, and comprises eighteen independent experts. Id at 2-3. Although it has no power to
enforce the ICCPR, the Committee collects reports from states and hears individual and interstate
complaints, bringing to light possible violations and interpreting the Covenant itself. Id at 4-5.
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two programs about homosexuality, noting that "public morals differ widely"
and "a certain margin of discretion must be accorded to the responsible national
authorities." 14 In addition, it has broadly interpreted the reputation exception to
apply not only to speech such as libel, but also to expression infringing on
privacy and political views endorsed by the state.15 In contrast, the Committee
has denounced overbroad restrictions based on national security, reasoning that
the Covenant does not allow nations to prohibit speech just because it advocates
the ideology of a political enemy. 6 In general, under this exception, courts have
allowed only measures outlawing speech that "incite[s] crime, violence, or mass
panic. 17
B. CURRENT LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 19
More than 150 nations have ratified the ICCPR, but many have not
enforced it. Many countries have failed to sign the first Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, which provides an international complaint process for individuals who
have exhausted domestic remedies.'" In addition, several countries that do not
consider treaties to be self-executing have not yet implemented legislation to
enforce the ICCPR or passed laws further restricting speech. Finally, even in
countries with legislation upholding Article 19 rights, the UN continues to issue
annual reports condemning their free speech practices.
The first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows individuals who claim a
violation of the Covenant's guarantees to submit a complaint for review and
consideration by the Committee so long as they have exhausted domestic
remedies. 9 Specifically, a party to the Protocol "recognizes the competence of
the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject
to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.' 2' Forty-eight-nearly one-third--of

15

Id at 122, citing Herberg v Finland,United Nations Human Rights Committee Communication
No 61/1979, CCPR/C/15/D/61/1979, 10.3 (Apr 2,1982) (internal citations omitted).
Id at 123, citing Ross v Canada, United Nations Human Rights Committee Communication No

16

11.5-11.6 (Oct 26, 2000).
736/1997, CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997,
Id at 123, citing United Nations Human Rights Committee, Comments by the Republic of Korea on the

17

Concluding Observations of the Human R'ghts Committee: Republic of Korea. 04/05/2000, Human Rights
Committee 69th Sess, CCPR/C/79/Add.122 7 (May 4, 2000).
Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz, and Melissa Castan, The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political

18

Rights: Cases, Materials,and Commentary § 18.26 at 396 (Oxford 2000).
Carlson and Gisvold, PracticalGuide at 2 (cited in note 3).

14

19
20

Id.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), art 1, 6 ILM
383, 383 (1967).
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countries that have ratified the ICCPR have not signed the Protocol,2' a
surprising fact given that the Committee does not have authority to make
binding decisions. Perhaps some governments know of existing violations and
fear the Committee will find and publicize them through the complaint process.
In addition, although some countries have implemented legislation that
effectively enforces the ICCPR, many others have instituted measures that curb
speech. For example, South Africa, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States allow freedom of speech if it does not provoke violence, which
roughly mirrors the national security language of the ICCPR.22 Others, including
Canada and New Zealand, do not explicitly include such limits and thus go
2
24
23
beyond the language of the ICCPR. Many others-such as France, Russia, 1
South Korea, 26 Syria,2" and Zimbabwe 2 8-have failed to enact legislation that
prevents free speech violations or, even worse, have enacted legislation
prohibiting certain forms of speech.
Finally, the UN and watchdog groups continue to issue warnings about
free speech violations in countries that have ratified the ICCPR. For example, in
21

22

23
24

A full list of these countries is available online. See Office of the United Nations High
Commission For Human Rights, Status of Ratificaions of the Pindpal International Human Rights
Treaties (2004), available online at <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf> (visited Apr 22,
2006).
See S Africa Const, ch 2, § 16(2)(b) (right to freedom of expression "does not extend to...
incitement of imminent violence"); Ireland Const, art 40, § 6.1(i) ("[O]rgans of public opinion ...
shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State."); Human
Rights Act 1998 (UK), ch 42, sch 1, art 10, § 2 ("The exercise of these freedoms [of
expression] ... may be subject to... the interests of national security, territorial integrity or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, [or]
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others."); US Const, amend I, as interpreted in
Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (declaring language designed to incite
"imminent lawless action" to be not protected by the First Amendment).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art 2(b); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 14.
See, for example, Jon Henley, France Outlaws Sexist and Anti-Gay Insults: Legislation Is Aimed at
Curbing Rising Homophobia, but Civil Liberty Groups Say Threats of Imprisonment and Heaty Fines Go Too
Far,Guardian Foreign Pages 13 (Dec 24, 2004).

25

26

27

28

See, for example, Sophia Kishkovsky, Russian Lawmakers Advance CounterterrorismMeasures, NY
Times A10 (Dec 18, 2004) (citing proposed legislation that would give the Kremlin authority to
curtail free speech).
See, for example, Barbara Demick, South Korean Sentenced Over Ideology', Socologist Charged with
Propagating the North's Doctrine Is Given a Seven-Year Term. Criics View the Case as a Cold War
Throwback, LA Times A3 (Mar 31, 2004).
See, for example, Howard Schneider, Free-Speech Case in Syria Shows Limits of Openness, Wash Post
A38 (Nov 23, 2001) (detailing the case of someone charged with undermining national unity
through speech at "civil society" sessions).
See, for example, Peta Thomycroft, Mugabe Outlaws Opposition and Bans Free Speech, Daily Telegraph
13 (Dec 19, 2001).
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December of 2004, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression denounced efforts by some nations to restrict access to public
information.2 9 More specifically, the UN has called for changes in several
countries that have ratified the ICCPR-including Belarus,3 ° Colombia,3 the
Ivory Coast,3 2 North Korea, 33 Serbia and Montenegro,34 and Turkmenistan. 35 In
addition, watchdog groups such as the London-based Article 19 continue to find
violations of international free speech regulations in countries across the world.3 6
Thus, even governments in countries that have signed the ICCPR have been
unwilling or unable to meaningfully enforce Article 19.

III. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
A recent case decided by the High Court, Coleman v Powers, through a
concurring opinion by Justice Michael Kirby, may provide an innovative way to
enforce obligations of the ICCPR without the need for legislation. Coleman
warrants a closer examination of Australia's free speech law.
A. AUSTRALIAN LAW PRIOR TO COLEMAN
The Australian constitution contains no express provision for free speech,
and prior to the 1990s, courts deciding defamation cases relied on common law

29

UN Press Release, Experts on Freedom of Expression Cal/for Steps to Change or Repeal Laws Resticting

30

Access to Information (Dec 15, 2004), available online at <http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/
huricane.nsf/0/9A56F80984C8BD5EC1256F6BO05C47F0?opendocument>
(visited Apr 22,
2006).
UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Sixieth Session: Part I, UN Doc E/CN.4/

31

2004/127 at 64-67 (2004).
UN Press Release, Special Rapporteuron Freedom of Expression Completes Mission to Colombia (Mar 1,

32

2004)
(denouncing speech-restrictive
and-terrorism
measures),
available
online at
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/viewO1/DA63B7B2764EFOC1256E4BOO303
891?opendocument> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
UN Press Release, Special Rapporteuron Freedom of Expression Ends Visit to Cdte D Ivoire (Oct 2, 2004)
(denouncing the beating of three journalists covering a presidential event), available online at
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/E9A9345FDBC48DA3C1256E3600355
8Al?opendocument> (visited Apr 22, 2006).

33

UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Sixtieth Session: PartI at 60-64 (cited in note 30).

34

UN Press Release, Special Rapporteuron Freedom of Opinion and Expression Completes Mission to Serbia
and Montenegro (Oct 19, 2004) (noting the high number of libel suits and mistreatment of
journalists),
available
online at
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view0l/
5320BE63996BFA22C1 256F50003E8A31?opendocument> (visited Apr 22, 2006).

35

UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Sixtieth Session: PartI at 57-60 (cited in note 30).
See generally Article 19: Global Campaign for Free Expression, available online at
<http://www.articlel9.org> (visited Apr 22, 2006).

36
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rules.37 Under these rules, libel plaintiffs had to prove three elementspublication, identification of the plaintiff, and defamatory meaning-and
defendants had three main defenses-"truth, opinion, and privilege."38
Moreover, although there had been several attempts to legislate the protections
found in Article 19 in the states, territories, and nationally, all had failed.39
Opponents voice several arguments, among them fears that such legislation
would politicize the judiciary; confidence that the government and courts already
protect rights; skepticism that enumerating rights would change their
enforcement; worries that defining such a list would limit rights; and
dissatisfaction with the potential costs of litigation.40
In line with at least one of these arguments-that courts adequately protect
rights-the High Court began in the 1990s to hold that the Australian
constitution implicitly protects political communication. This culminated in the
landmark case Theophanous v Herald & Weeky Times, in which a legislator sued a
newspaper and the author of a letter criticizing his views on immigration
policy. 41 The court held that political discussion, "discussion of the conduct,
policies or fitness for office of government, political parties, public bodies,
public officers and those seeking public office... [and] discussion of the
political views and public conduct of persons who are engaged in activities that
have become the subject of political debate," is protected by the Australian
constitution.42 But, to avoid liability, the justices reasoned, a defendant must
prove he was unaware the published statements were false, he did not publish
the material recklessly, and the publication was reasonable.4 3
The High Court rejected a challenge to this implied constitutional
protection in another landmark case in 1997. In Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Cotporation, in which former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange sued a
television station for its on-air comments that he was unfit to serve in public

37

See generally Theophanous v Herald & Weeky Times, 182 CLR 104, 140 (1994) (Ausd).

38
39

Russell L. Weaver and David F. Partlett, Defamation, the Media, and Free Speech: Australia'sExperiment
with ExpandedQualifiedPrivilege,36 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 377, 382 (2004).
Roy Jordan, Parliamentary Library of Australia, Research Note No 42 2001-02, Free Speech and the
Constitution (June 4, 2002), available online at <http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/rn/200102/02m42.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006).

40

Id.

41

Theophanous, 182 CLR at 118.

42

Id at 124.

43

Id at 141. The justices carefully noted that the free speech paradigm in Australia differs from
those in Canada and the United States in that the former seeks to protect only political discussion
as "an indispensable element in ensuring the efficacious working of representative democracy and
government," not "freedom of expression generally as a fundamental human right." Id at 125.
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office," the High Court used its power to declare Australian common law by
extending the qualified privilege defense to communication about government
or political matters. 4' The justices relied primarily on sections 7 and 24 of the
Australian constitution, which provide, respectively, that Senators and Members
be directly elected by the people.46 The unanimous court reasoned that "related
sections of the Constitution necessarily protect that freedom of communication
between the people concerning political or government matters which enables
the people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors. 4 7
B. COLEMAN
Against this backdrop, the High Court decided Coleman v Power. The case
involved an incident in March 2000 in which Queensland police approached
graduate student Patrick Coleman in a local mall as he handed out pamphlets
urging citizens to "[g]et to know your local corrupt type cops" and naming
specific officers as alleged crooks.48 When one such officer, Brendan Power,
addressed him, Coleman said: "This is Constable Brendan Power, a corrupt
police officer., 49 A struggle ensued, and the police arrested Coleman and later
charged him with two counts each of assault and obstruction of justice and one
count each of using insulting words and distributing printed matter containing
insulting words.50 The latter two offenses were illegal under Queensland's
Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act ("Vagrants Act"), enacted in 1931. 5'
The law, though now amended,52 criminalized the use of "any threatening,
abusive, or insulting words to any person"5 3 and the publication of "any

44

Lange v AustralianBroadcastingCorp, 189 CLR 520, 521 (1997) (Austl).

45

See id at 571.

46

Id at 557-60. See also Austl Const, §§7, 24.

47

Lange, 189 CLR at 560.

48

Coleman v Power, 220 CLR 1, 35 (2004) (Austl).

49

Id at 36 (internal citations omitted).

so

Id.

51

See Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act of 1931, in 9 The Public Acts ofQueensland (Reprint):
Clasified andAnnotated 1828-1936 705, 717-19 (Butterworth 1936).
The Queensland Legislature replaced section 7 of the Vagrants Act with a public nuisance law.

52

See Police Powers and Responsibilities and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003, available
(visited
online at <http://www.legislation.qld.govau/Bils/5OPDF/2003/PolPwAmdBO3.pdf>
Apr 22, 2006).
53

Vagrants Act, § 7(d) in The Public Acts of.Queensland at 717 (cited in note 51). The original section
provided:
Any person who, in any public place or so near to any public place that any
person who might be therein, and whether any person is therein or not, could
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threatening, abusive, or insulting words" that injure a person's reputation.5 4
These provisions likely violated Article 19.
Three years later, the High Court set aside Coleman's conviction for the
use of insulting words by a 4-3 majority.5 5 Although the court did not invalidate
the applicable portion of the Vagrants Act, the majority limited its application to
cases in which the insulting words "are used in, or within hearing of, a public
are intended.., or
place... [and] are provocative in the sense that either they
5 6
they are reasonably likely to provoke unlawful retaliation."
The majority of justices did not rely on international law in coming to this
conclusion, but one justice did, providing an innovative way to think about
ICCPR enforcement in representative democracies. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Kirby noted that upholding the statute "would arguably diminish
fundamental human rights," particularly those prescribed by international law.5
This nod to international standards marked
a departure from Theophanous, and
though mentioned in arguments in Lange, 58 was more extensively discussed in
Coleman. Citing free speech provisions in the ICCPR, Justice Kirby noted that
"[t]his Court has accepted that these considerations inevitably bring to bear on
the expression of Australian law the influence of the ICCPR and the principles
there stated .... [P]olitical expression is clearly protected by Art 19 of the
ICCPR."' 9 Although the full court relied primarily on the Australian
constitution-not the ICCPR-to enforce free speech obligations, Justice Kirby
argued: "In time, the present resistance to [using international law to construe
statutes] will pass. The principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
expressed in the ICCPR, preceded 60their expression in that treaty. They long
preceded Australia's adherence to it."

view or hear... (d) Uses any threatening, abusive, or insulting words to any
person... shall be liable.
54

Id at § 7A(1)(c) at 719. The section provides: "Any person... (c) Who delivers or distributes in
any manner whatsoever printed matter containing any such words ... shall be liable."

55

The government did not pursue the allegation of distributing printed materials with insulting
words. See Coleman, 220 CLR at 79.

56

Id at 74.

57

Id at 87 (Kirby concurring).

58

Lange, 189 CLR at 543 ('The court may also draw on international law to influence the common
law in this direction, especially Art XIX of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which provides for a freedom of expression, including a freedom to seek, receive, and
impart information of all kinds.").

59

Coleman, 220 CLR at 92 (Kirby concurring).

60

Id at 94.
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IV. LEARNING FROM THE KIRBY CONCURRENCE IN COLEMAN:

COURTS AS FREE SPEECH GUARANTORS
Although nations face different problems implementing the ICCPR,
Australia's growing experience, as articulated by Justice Kirby, offers an
important lesson: courts may play an important role in specifically enforcing the
right to free speech protected by Article 19. Indeed, the High Court stepped
forward to fill an important gap in Australia's political and legal landscape, and
in doing so, moved the nation one step closer to ICCPR compliance. Justice
Kirby's concurrence, and the gradual evolution of Australia's free speech
doctrine, through the line of cases beginning with Tbeophanous, may serve as a
model for other countries struggling to comply with their international
obligations and guarantee a right fundamental to democracy itself. At the same
time, one must be wary of recommending this approach without modification,
in particular because the movement succeeded on the back of a judiciary willing
to be proactive in interpreting its constitution. Such activism may border on
undesirable policymaking, and the High Court has not yet expanded protection
to nonpolitical speech, with several justices rejecting Justice Kirby's approach.
The High Court, in cloaking free speech in democratic fundamentals,
created a clever and innovative method for complying with ICCPR free speech
standards without legislation, one that could be effective in any country with an
elected representative government. Specifically, the Lange court relied heavily on
the need for communication on political matters that may affect citizens'
impressions and, consequently, their votes; this argument gains inherent strength
from its foundation on the basic principles of adequate representation.
Moreover, as suggested by Justice Kirby, courts can and do look beyond their
nation's founding documents to international law to realize these democratic
fundamentals.
Since Coleman, Justice Kirby has further expounded on his general view that
courts ought to use international law to resolve constitutional and statutory
ambiguity.6' He developed this opinion during a conference that produced the
Bangalore Principles. As he explained, "The crucial idea of the Bangalore
Principles was that international human rights law might sometimes provide
guidance to judges in cases concerning human rights and fundamental
freedoms."62 As advantages to the approach, Justice Kirby noted primarily that
texts delineating fundamental rights and freedoms ought to be interpreted by
"expert elaborations of the same, or like, provisions in other national

61

See generally Michael Kirby, InternationalLa--Te Impact on National Constitutions, 21 Am U Intl L
Rev 327 (2005).

62

Id at 335.
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constitutions and in international courts and tribunals. ' 63 Moreover, he argued,
comparisons to international law may help a judge choose the best solution,64
prevent rash judgments, 6 and bolster the development of international law
66
itself.
In the area of free speech, this approach is particularly attractive not only
for its innovation, but also for its immunization of political speech from
legislative attempts to quash it. In other words, giving courts the duty to enforce
international individual rights removes the issue from the legislative sphere. This
is particularly salient in countries where judges are guaranteed life tenure and
compensation. 67 For example, a federal judge in the United States, guaranteed
68
such protections under the US Constitution, need not worry about the political
ramifications of her decisions, to the extent she might be concerned about her
career. Thus, given the importance of free speech and other individual
guarantees under the ICCPR-laws already on the books-it is sensible that
such judges, unaffected by political considerations such as reelection, would
carry the responsibility to enforce them.
Furthermore, a judicial approach to free speech guarantees is desirable
because it may gradually ease a nation into a position that recognizes Article 19
obligations explicitly. This may be more desirable than a quick legislative
approach, which in addition to carrying the political risks already described,
might create immediate backlash from opponents. In other words, change can
not legislators, are more likely
be more palatable in small increments, and courts,
69
to avail themselves of this gradual progression.
Finally, judicial enforcement of the ICCPR may be more desirable when
defining free speech guarantees with precision is particularly difficult. Leaving
the solution to the legislative process risks imposing a standard that is not only
inconsistent with ICCPR guarantees, but perhaps also too rigid. This is already
evident from the Committee's seemingly outdated interpretation of "public
morals" under Article 19.70 Unlike legislators, however, the Committee, and

63

Id at 356-57.

64

Id at 359.

65

Id at 359-60.

66

Id at 360-61.

67

68

Although the Australian constitution does not grant life tenure to federal judges, it allows removal
only for "incapacity" or "proved misbehavior" and requires retirement at age seventy, still
isolating them from political pressures. See Austl Const, ch 3, § 72.
See US Const, art 3, § 1.

69

For more support for this argument, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67

70

NYU L Rev 1185, 1198-1209 (1992).
See note 14.
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more generally, courts, may change these interpretations as community
standards evolve. That is, in the future, the Committee might decide, for
example, that censorship of programs involving homosexuality is no longer
appropriate under the "public morals" exception.
These advantages point to one pitfall in the Kirby approach: In urging
judges to consider international law in domestic controversies, it may allow them
too much power, particularly for those judges lacking a democratic pedigree.
Several counterarguments exist. First, in many countries, an elected executive, in
negotiating treaties, in fact has the power to make such weighty judgments;
courts merely enforce these decisions by applying the law. Second, the right to
free speech is almost universally accepted, perhaps to the point of being a
fundamental right, something that neither legislatures nor courts should ignore.
Third, international law may in fact cabin some judicial power by preventing
passionate decisions made in the heat of the moment;7 for example, in the midst
of a quasi-war, civil liberties are often at risk under domestic law but hold firm
under international law. Fourth, in making decisions judges rely on many
sources, not all of which derive from democratic institutions; for example, the
public does not elect legal scholars and yet judges frequently cite their work.72
Thus, concerns about judicial power with respect to such major policy decisions,
though valid to some degree, are overstated.
Moreover, Justice Kirby's approach is limited by its seeming inability to
extend constitutional protection to nonpolitical expression.73 Admittedly,
political speech, above all other types, should be protected; many countries
could not have achieved independence and forged social progress without it. At
the same time, freedom of all speech is an important international goal, as
evidenced by ICCPR Article 19 and the conscious decision of its drafters to
protect nonpolitical speech. 4 Furthermore, many countries have recognized the
need for speech on nonpolitical topics ranging from art to commerce. For
example, the South African Constitutional Court, in invalidating a law
prohibiting all establishments with liquor licenses from allowing anyone to
perform obscene acts or appear nude, noted the importance in construing its
own free speech provision broadly: "The right to freedom of expression is
71
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The Australian justices recently confirmed this when the High Court found that advertising
regulations did not violate the nation's constitution. The justices cited their concern for "the
system of responsible and representative government set up by the Constitution, not a general
freedom of communication of the kind protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution." APLA Lid v Legal Serices Commissioner (NSW), 219 ALR 403, 27 (2005) (Ausd),
citing Coleman v Power, 209 ALR 182, 206 (2004) (Austl).
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Vol. 7No. 1

Using Courts to Enforce the Free Speech Provisions of the ICCPR

Kumar

integral to democracy, to human development and to human life itself."75
Similarly, in invalidating a zoning ordinance regulating the posting of
advertisements, the Canadian Supreme Court advocated protection of
commercial speech: "The need for such expression derives from the very nature
of our economic system, which is based on the existence of a free market. The
orderly operation of that market depends on businesses and consumers having
access to abundant and diverse information., 76 Finally, consider the recent
exposure of accounting scandals at major US corporations, which led to public
outcry and discourse on the nature of large businesses and their
responsibilities, 77 speech undoubtedly protected by the First Amendment of the
country's constitution.
Despite this analysis, the criticism that courts may not be able to enforce
guarantees for nonpolitical speech may be overstated, particularly if courts
rationally recognize the inherent ambiguity of a political speech-only standard
and look instead to the ICCPR. In other words, defining political speech is a
difficult task, and when considering different examples, most speech will be
political in some way. For example, if a court were confronted with the
accounting scandals, it would almost certainly have to protect the ensuing public
commentary-which, although seemingly commercial, would likely affect voters'
decisions in elections and referenda.
One final caution must be noted: In nations in which the judiciary feels
greater pressure to exercise restraint, either because of tradition or political
pressure, using the courts to enforce Article 19 will be less successful. The
Australian High Court took a controversial approach by reading a personal
guarantee of free speech into a constitution that provides no explicit personal
guarantees whatsoever. In the ICCPR and subsequent legislation of individual
countries, the free speech guarantees have been express. Moreover, in countries
with courts unwilling to look beyond the text in construing constitutions or to
international law, the approach will not be helpful."
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Phillipsv Directorof PublicProsecutions, 2003 (4) BCLR 357, 2003 SACLR LEXIS 11, 26 (CC 2003) (S
Africa).
Guignardv City of Saint-Hyacinthe, 2002 SCR 472, 483 (2002) (Canada).
See, for example, Christine Dunn, Managers Campaignfor Corporate Reforms; After Scandals, Some
Demand Greater Disclosure, Wash Post H4 (July 7, 2002) (citing scandals at Enron, Tyco, and
WorldCom).
More general counterarguments to this approach have been articulated. For a defense, see Kirby,
21 Am U Ind L Rev at 346-56 (cited in note 61).
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V. CONCLUSION
In sum, a judicial approach to defining and enforcing the ICCPR's free
speech obligations, as exemplified by the Australian experience, and in particular
the views of Justice Kirby, may be an important tool for countries with
representative governments and courts willing to bear the risk of deviating from
the text of their constitutions and rely on international law. Despite Australia's
inability thus far to protect nonpolitical words, practical considerations-namely
the ambiguity of the standard-indicate that courts will not always find this to
be the case. Furthermore, the Australian cases themselves demonstrate that even
in places where efforts to legislate free speech have died in political battles, it is
possible to use the courts as a powerful tool in explicitly recognizing free speech
rights. Indeed, Justice Kirby's approach specifically indicates that a judicial
solution to the free speech problem may be the most desirable kind because it
immunizes the issue from political pressure, implements change in palatable and
gradual increments, adequately defines amorphous individual rights, and above
all, safeguards free speech guarantees in the founding documents of nations and
in the ICCPR.
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